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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this study is to research permanent layoff announcements’ im-
pact on stock prices and to compare the stock price reactions between growth 
and value stocks.  
 
The data consist of 160 announcements for the disclosures of permanent layoffs 
with Finnish large and mid-size listed companies from the Nasdaq OMX Hel-
sinki in the time period of January 2004 until June 2010.  Event study methodol-
ogy is used to examine the abnormal performance for permanent layoff an-
nouncements and the analysis of stock price reactions to permanent layoffs is 
divided into three different parts according to the cited reason for the layoff, the 
difference between growth and value in two different business cycles and 
whether the layoff and firm size have impact on the abnormal returns.  
 
The stock price reaction to permanent layoffs is positive, but not statistically 
significant, for both declined demand and improved efficiency subsamples, 
when the abnormal performance is observed regarding the cited reason. Value 
stocks signal a more negative reaction in non-recessionary period of 2004-2007 
and less positive reaction in the recessionary period of 2008-2010 than growth 
stocks. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
KEYWORDS: Permanent layoffs, abnormal return, value stock, growth stock, 
event study 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Last few years have been times of great financial turmoil across the world and 
the global financial crisis has been hitting companies as well as economies hard 
during this time. Financial markets have seen enormous downfalls and people 
of all classes have lived in fear of a new Great Depression, a scene from history 
no one wants to experience all over again. 
The matter of fact is that this global financial crisis ranging from 2007 until to-
day has been the biggest slump in the global economy since the Great Depres-
sion of the 1930s. Governments are trying to boost their own economies by dif-
ferent measures, but until this day very few have succeeded in turning the di-
rection. Stock markets remain to be very volatile and investors hope for the 
governments’ actions to be effective. Bankruptcies, write-downs and unem-
ployment have been every-day life all over the world and the media has re-
ported these incidents daily or at least on a weekly basis. During a financial cri-
sis or a recession layoffs usually increase, since companies have to perform cost-
cutting or restructuring measures to cope with the economic environment. The 
on-going situation in the global economy is a good starting point for this thesis 
and it gives this study and the results presented a wider point of view.  
A layoff can be defined as a temporary or permanent termination of an em-
ployee from the payroll of an organization (Cornfield 1983). The topic of layoff 
announcements was first brought up in the late-1970s and early 1980s and the 
impact of layoff announcements on various economic and social factors has 
been under research ever since.  
The popularity for firms announcing layoffs has been increasing over the years 
since the 1980s and during the last decade layoffs have been America’s export 
for the rest of the world making these actions more common in various coun-
tries. The different measures and outcomes of laying employees off are ranging 
from improved profits and post-announcement firm performance to negative 
stock market reactions and declined productivity, but one thing that is certain is 
that firms getting “lean and mean” see the action of layoff announcement as a 
powerful tool in the time of recession, as well as during an expansion of the 
economy. (Pfeffer 2010.) 
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Firms lay off workers for a variety of reasons. Layoffs may be a firm’s way of 
optimally responding to demand shifts, to changes in its competitive position 
within the industry, or to financial distress. Moreover, layoffs are often a part of 
firm’s downsizing, downscoping, or restructuring strategies. Stock price reac-
tions to layoff announcements may differ depending on whether layoffs are 
permanent or temporary, small or large, a single announcement or part of a se-
ries of announcements, and positive or negative. (Lee 1997.) 
In Finland, the on-going recession has doubled the amount of workers, who 
have been permanently laid off in the year 2009 and tripled the amount of 
workers, who are under co-determination negotiations, the negotiations for 
layoffs in companies, for the same period (Artto 2010). This study concentrates 
on researching the permanent layoff announcements’ impact on stock prices in 
Finland and the current recession makes the topic of layoff announcements 
even more interesting.  
Layoff announcements and their effect on the stock market are interesting is-
sues in the financial world at the moment and this thesis is trying to provide 
proper insight in these matters by analyzing the stock reactions in the Finnish 
market.  An important contribution of this study is to be the first of its kind to 
research the layoff announcements’ impact separately on value and growth 
stocks. Not only is the topic of this study current, but one of the main objectives 
is also to provide new, remarkable evidence on the matter of permanent layoff 
announcements and stock price reactions.  
 
1.1.  Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this study is to research permanent layoff announcements’ im-
pact on stock prices and to compare the stock price reactions between growth 
and value stocks. This study focuses on the stock market reaction for the final 
disclosure of permanent layoffs, indicating the announcement for the final deci-
sion of the company co-determination negotiations. Therefore, this study takes 
a different point of view in observing abnormal stock returns related to layoffs 
than many previous research studies. The new perspective is the analysis of 
possible differing reactions between growth and value stocks’ reactions to per-
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manent layoff announcements. This thesis also focuses on the information value 
of layoff announcements in general and post-announcement firm performance 
with respect to previous research studies. The data presented in the study is 
taken from the Finnish stock market and the Nasdaq OMX Helsinki Stock Ex-
change. The data consist of 160 announcements for permanent layoffs with Fin-
nish large and mid-size listed companies in the time period of January 2004 un-
til June 2010.  The time period includes a non-recessionary period ranging from 
January 2004 until December 2007, as well as a recessionary period ranging 
from January 2008 until June 2010.  
Permanent layoffs are regarded as actions which cause larger stock market reac-
tions than temporary layoffs and permanent layoffs’ impact on stock prices has 
not been researched too much in the Finnish market. Therefore, it is interesting 
to examine the stock price reaction to permanent layoffs in the Finnish market 
with also evidence from the recent recession in the financial markets. Research 
evidence states that value stocks outperform growth stocks on the long run and 
this value-growth effect is researched in this thesis from the perspective of per-
manent layoffs. The differences in value and growth stocks’ reaction to perma-
nent layoffs is tested in both recessionary and non-recessionary business cycles 
to find out whether the value stocks are more likely to react distressed in reces-
sions or less proactive in non-recessions.  This thesis is based on the following 
research questions regarding permanent layoffs and stock price reactions as 
indicated below: 
Q1:  Do stock prices react to the disclosures of permanent layoff an-
nouncements? 
Q2:  Does the stock price reaction to permanent layoff announcements’ 
disclosure differ between growth and value stocks? 
Q3:  Value stocks signal a less positive or more negative reaction to 
permanent layoff disclosures during different business cycles than 
growth stocks. 
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1.2. Contribution of the study 
There are a few important contributions related with this thesis, which have not 
been researched in previous research studies. First of all, this study is based on 
Finnish market data with evidence from the latest recession. Researching stock 
price reactions to permanent layoffs in Finland in the course of the recessionary 
period of 2008–2010 is one of the contributions of this study. Secondly, this the-
sis takes the perspective of observing the differences of value and growth stock 
reactions to permanent layoffs in different business cycles. This has not been 
done in any of the previous research studies and, therefore, it can be held as a 
major contribution for further research.  
 
1.3. Structure of the study 
The structure of this study proceeds as follows. In chapter 2, previous research 
studies of layoff announcements are presented and the most important point of 
views and results from these papers are reviewed in order to build basis for 
further research in this thesis. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework in-
volved in layoff announcements and stock price reactions. Also the theoretical 
framework for value and growth stocks is presented in chapter 3. The data and 
methodology for this study are reviewed in chapter 4 followed by the empirical 
results in chapter 5. The conclusions and implications for further research are 
presented in chapter 6.  
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2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH STUDIES 
In this chapter, previous studies are examined more thoroughly and the main 
findings of these studies are presented to build basis for this thesis. There have 
been research papers on the subject of layoff announcements since the 1980s, 
but the most groundbreaking studies have been published in the 1990s and the 
research has been more consistent until this period. Many of the previous stu-
dies concentrate on the market reaction of the layoff announcements and the 
post-announcement firm performance, but also layoff characteristics have been 
studied in the previous research publications.  
The results in previous studies are rather mixed and the findings need to be 
explained more closely. It is important to look over and understand the findings 
from the previous studies before proceeding to the theoretical framework and 
exploring further research. The three parts of this chapter consist of studies in-
volving layoff announcements and the reaction in stock price, financial perfor-
mance and the layoff characteristics (size, business cycle etc.). The effect of 
layoff announcements on value and growth stocks has not been studied before 
and, therefore, this matter is brought up more closely in the theoretical frame-
work chapter along with the stock valuation theories. 
 
2.1 Layoff announcements and stock price reactions 
Worrell, Davidson and Sharma (1991) studied the reaction of the U.S. securities 
market to 194 layoff announcements from the years between 1979 and 1987. The 
study divided the reasons for the layoffs into two different categories: financial 
distress and restructuring. Evidence from the paper suggested that market reac-
tions to layoffs were negative, especially during financial distress, and the an-
nouncements of large or permanent layoffs impacted a stronger stock reaction.  
The study was groundbreaking in many ways and it presented a different ap-
proach than the studies that had been done before. When many previous stu-
dies focused on more social and psychological impacts of layoff announce-
ments, this study brought in the strategic and financial impact of layoffs and 
examined the financial consequences of layoff announcements for firms. The 
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paper has been widely regarded as a basis study for researching layoffs and 
financial factors and the contributions of the paper can be seen as remarkable 
until this day. The focus of the paper was in bottom-line results of layoff an-
nouncements meaning the shareholder returns, which is an important part of 
the puzzle for this thesis as well. (Worrell, Davidson and Sharma 1991.) 
Ursel and Armstrong-Stassen (1995) researched the reactions of shareholders to 
137 layoff announcements by 57 Canadian firms over the recessionary time pe-
riod of January 1989 until August 1992. The study found out that shareholders 
react negatively to layoff announcements in their company. The first an-
nouncement for layoffs in the company resulted in a larger negative reaction 
than the later announced layoffs. As in the research paper by Worrell et al. the 
large-scale layoffs were found to impact a stronger negative reaction than the 
announcements involving small percentage of the firms’ workforce. The study 
concludes that the magnitude of the impact of announcements on stock prices is 
a function of two factors. In addition to the economic impact of the announce-
ment event, also the degree to which the announcement has been anticipated by 
investors is taken into consideration (see Malatesta & Thompson 1985).  
Ursel and Armstrong-Stassen (1995) provide many important aspects to under-
standing the relationship between layoffs and stock price returns. The study 
suggests a few additional ideas to the research paper by Worrell et al (1991). 
First of all, the study claims that the reactions to layoffs differ during recessio-
nary and non-recessionary times. This point is important to understand, when 
the data in different research papers is taken from different business cycles. 
Downsizing during an economic downturn and upturn might have differing 
impacts on shareholders and the business cycles should be taken into consid-
eration. The business cycles are taken into closer review later in this thesis.  
Second suggestion pointed out by Ursel and Armstrong-Stassen is that the dis-
tinction between layoffs due to financial distress and those due to restructuring 
needs to be further questioned. This suggestion brings into question, if the in-
formation contents in the firms’ official announcements are reliable and fur-
thermore, if the country standards for transparency in business communica-
tions are trustworthy. Layoff announcements provide new information for in-
vestors and shareholders and the way in which the reasons for the layoff are 
stated give the observing groups the perceptions for either good or bad news. 
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The information content of layoffs is presented more thoroughly in the follow-
ing chapters of this thesis.  
Thirdly, Ursel and Armstrong-Stassen make clear that there’s a certain differ-
ence between observing multiple announcements and only one announcement 
by the sample firms. This is an important suggestion, when the same firm an-
nounces multiple layoff announcements and the effects of these layoffs need to 
be analyzed in the sample time period of the research. An analysis on the effect 
of multiple layoff announcements by the same firm compared against the single 
announcement effect is presented later in this thesis.  
In the study by Lin and Rozeff (1993) the adjustment of stock prices to real va-
riables was taken into closer observation. The study tested the relation of stock-
holder wealth to so called cost-cutting measures. Different operational an-
nouncements and their effect on stock prices were tested and in addition to 
layoffs, also operation closings and pay cuts were included in the sample. The 
paper consisted of over 1800 announcements of large U.S. firms over the time 
period of 1979-1985, which included two recessions. The cost-cutting an-
nouncements tend to occur after the stocks of the companies have experienced 
significant price declines of 12% to 35% and since the sample time period in-
cludes two recessionary periods, we can notice a certain pattern leading to the 
announcements. Poor business conditions indicating an economic downturn 
lead to plummeting stock prices, which lead the market to anticipate the firms 
to announce operational cost-cutting measures, f. ex. layoffs. (Lin & Rozeff 
1993.)  
Lin and Rozeff find the operational announcements to cause a negative market 
reaction and the results are consistent with Ursel and Armstrong-Stassen (1995) 
that announcements impact the stock market negatively and the announce-
ments are somewhat anticipated by investors. Another similarity with these 
two previously presented papers is that the first cost-cutting event in a wider 
sequence of events surprises the market more than subsequent events.  
Lin and Rozeff (1993) divided the operational measures into two competing 
hypotheses that were supposed to predict the effects of cost-cutting on share-
holder wealth: the pure efficiency and the decreased demand hypothesis. The 
pure efficiency hypothesis expected that stock prices would increase after a 
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cost-cutting event, which would improve efficiency and cash flows, but since 
the operational announcements resulted in only decreased stock price reactions, 
the decreased demand was the hypothesis that was found effective. Significant 
evidence was found for only the decreased demand hypothesis indicating cost-
cutting to be “bad news,” but not for the pure efficiency hypothesis.  
The declined demand and enhanced efficiency hypotheses can be seen in vari-
ous other studies as well. Palmon, Sun and Tang (1997) sort out the reasons for 
the layoff into positive and negative by dividing the reasons into improved effi-
ciency and declined demand subsamples. The paper uses a data sample of 140 
layoff announcements from the U.S. markets taken from the years between 1982 
and 1990. The basis for the study comes from the assumption that the reason 
cited for the layoffs in the firm’s announcement has an effect on the stock price 
reaction. Palmon et al. document an association between the cited reasons in 
layoff announcements and abnormal stock returns around layoff announcement 
dates.  
One of the hypotheses used in the study by Palmon et al. (1997) indicated that 
the returns on equities should be negative for the firms announcing adverse 
market condition and positive for the firms that cite improving efficiency as a 
reason for the layoffs. The most important finding in this study was that both 
positive and negative stock price reactions to layoff announcements exist for the 
used sample data. Previous studies had reported mainly negative stock price 
reactions to layoffs and the finding of a significant positive stock price reaction 
proved essential for the later research studies.  
Both positive and negative reaction to layoff announcements were also found in 
the study by Kashefi and McKee (2002). The study consisted of a sample of 174 
layoff announcements involving U.S. companies between 1992 and 1998, during 
a time period of continuing economic expansion and low unemployment. Con-
sistent with the previously presented study by Palmon et al. (1997), Kashefi and 
McKee found significant abnormal stock price returns for both restructuring 
(proactive) and financial distress (reactive) sample groups. Layoff decisions in-
duced by a restructuring strategy were found to cause positive stock price re-
turns and layoffs that were motivated to reduce costs and increase profit mar-
gins, perhaps in anticipation of declining sales, caused negative stock price re-
turns. In comparison to studies by Worrell et al. (1991) and Palmon et al. (1997), 
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Kashefi and McKee establish a higher magnitude for both positive and negative 
market reactions to layoff announcements and the paper suggests that the mag-
nitude of the stock price impact is more profound in the 1990s. This may impli-
cate that the magnitude of the stock price impact to layoffs changes over time, 
when layoffs become even more widespread and the flexibility in the labor 
market increases in different countries.  
Farber and Hallock (2009) studied the changing relationship between layoff an-
nouncements1 and stock prices during a 30-year period ranging from 1970 until 
1999 and the study consisted of a very large sample of 4273 layoff announce-
ments from 1160 large firms in the U.S. Clear evidence was found that the rela-
tionship between layoff announcements and stock prices has become less nega-
tive over time. One explanation for this finding was that, over the last three 
decades, layoff announcements designed to improve efficiency have become 
more common relative to the announcements designed to cope with decreased 
demand.  
Research evidence shows that there are differences in the stock price reactions 
between countries. According to Lee (1997), the disparities can potentially be a 
result of different effects of national culture on market structure, organizational 
form, and the effectiveness of differing strategies favored in each country. Lee 
(1997) studied the differences between the United States and Japan and ob-
tained data from 300 U.S. and 73 Japanese firms’ layoff announcements from 
the time period ranging from 1990 until 1994. The study reports that stock price 
reactions are negative in both U.S. and Japan and the investors in both countries 
clearly view layoffs negatively. Therefore, the study suggests that both proac-
tive and reactive layoff announcements cause negative stock returns in the 
market. Proactive layoff announcement is described as a way of restructuring 
and maintaining the competitiveness of the firm in a changing economic and 
strategic environment. On the other hand, reactive layoff announcement is re-
garded as a result of poor performance of the firm and as a signal to the inves-
tors that the firm is trying to turnaround the direction of the business. Not sur-
prisingly, reactive layoff announcements were found to yield significantly more 
negative returns than proactive ones, but the positive stock price reaction simi-
lar to the study by Palmon et al. (1997) was not to be found. (Lee 1997.) 
                                               
1 referred in the study by Farber & Hallock (2009) as reductions in force (RIFs) 
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Negative stock market reaction to layoff announcements seems to be effective in 
the United Kingdom’s (UK) markets, even though, UK firms’ layoff announce-
ments and the impact on stock prices has not been researched as much as the 
U.S. markets. McKnight, Lowrie and Coles (2002) found evidence that the UK 
markets generally react negatively to layoff announcements and that the sensi-
tivity of investor reactions to layoffs may be more pronounced in the UK than 
the U.S. Significant research results were found to support the hypothesis that 
firms announcing reactive layoffs caused negative stock price reactions and this 
finding is consistent with previous studies.  
Similar results were found in the study by Hillier, Marshall, McColgan and We-
rema (2007), where the causes and consequences of employee layoff decisions 
were examined within a sample of 322 layoff announcements issued by UK 
firms between the years 1990 and 2000. The research paper concentrated on 
permanent layoffs, which comprised at least 0,1% of the firm’s outstanding 
workforce. The results of the study suggest that poor operating performance 
and stock price performance, increased gearing and threats to managerial con-
trol precede employee layoffs. These suggestions point out that firms, which lay 
off employees in the UK are driven to this measure under the influence of poor 
business conditions. This finding is consistent with the previously reviewed 
study by Lin & Rozeff (1993). The stock price reaction to layoff announcements 
in the UK is found to be significantly negative after reactive layoff announce-
ments, such as responds to loss making activities and plant closures. Layoffs 
that are proactive, such as those related to reorganizations and cost-cutting, eli-
cit only a minimal and not significant stock price response in the UK markets.  
Most studies on the stock price reaction to layoff announcements concentrate on 
the short-term market reaction and very few research papers have taken the 
aspect of long-term stock price performance following the announcement pe-
riod. Brown and Ridgewell (1998) investigated the long-term effect of layoffs on 
shareholder wealth and found significant positive stock returns on firms an-
nouncing layoffs on the long-run. The final data sample consisted of 64 layoff 
announcements from the U.S. market between the years 1980 and 1991 and the 
long-term stock performance was observed up to 500 days after the initial layoff 
announcement. Even though, the study agreed on previous studies with the 
short-term negative market reaction around the announcement date, the main 
findings of the study indicated that investors typically misinterpret the an-
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nouncement of layoffs as a signal that the firm is on a decline. Therefore, the 
study suggested that investors view the event as a “sell” signal for the stocks. 
The study concluded that investors can earn excess returns for prolonged pe-
riods of time by investing in firms after layoff announcements. (Brown & Rid-
gewell 1998.) 
The study by Brown and Ridgewell (1998) provides an interesting aspect into 
the range of studies about layoff announcements, but observing the long-term 
stock performance is problematic to say the least.  The different business cycles 
of the economy affect the stock returns and the cyclicality might have a large 
impact on the study results. Business cycles are observed in the following parts 
of this chapter.   
A wide range of studies suggest that layoff announcements have a significant, 
negative reaction to stock prices and this indicates that layoffs are seen more as 
a way of responding to financial distress rather than as an optimal way of cop-
ing with the economic environment (Lee 1997). Investors seem to consider 
layoffs as an action, which indicates uncertainty for the future performance of 
the announcing companies. Whether the layoffs are good or bad for the firm’s 
future prospects, further review for the previous studies is needed. In the next 
part of this chapter, layoff announcements and post-announcement firm per-
formance are taken into closer observation.  
 
2.2 Layoff announcements and financial performance 
Layoffs and post-announcement financial performance have been under review 
in various studies and the results are again rather mixed. Since the research 
evidence seems to be puzzling, this area of study needs closer observation and 
the different results and point of views on financial performance from previous 
studies are presented in this part of the chapter.  
Investors consider layoffs as credible signals of future performance. Layoff de-
cision can be associated with either an increase or a decrease in firm value. 
Layoff decision induced by adverse market conditions, such as demand de-
clines or input price increases, should indicate declines in sales and profitability 
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and since layoffs convey new information on adverse market conditions, there 
should be a negative reaction in firm values and stock prices. Layoff decisions 
that result from unexpected efficiency gains (or plans for efficiency improve-
ments) should be associated with increased sales, improved profitability meas-
ures and, therefore, higher firm values and positive stock price reactions. The 
cited reasons for layoffs are useful signals for investors, because these reasons 
are associated with the expected changes in profitability measures in the years 
following the announcement.  (Palmon et al. 1997.) 
One hypothesis used in the previously presented study by Palmon et al. (1997) 
suggested that firms that cite an adverse market condition as a reason for 
layoffs have worse future profitability and sales measures than those for firms 
citing improved efficiency as a reason. Profit margin, real sales and return on 
assets (ROA) and equity (ROE) were observed for a six year period, three years 
prior to and three years after the firms’ layoff announcements, and significant 
evidence was found to indicate that firms citing improved efficiency outper-
formed the declining demand subsample in all four profitability and sales 
measures in the years following the announcement. Therefore, the cited reason 
for layoffs can be considered as a credible signal of future performance for 
shareholders.  
According to Elayan, Swales, Maris and Scott (1998) the market reaction to 
layoff announcements depends on the information set available to shareholders 
and on the financial performance of the firm before the announcement. The 
study consisted of 646 U.S. layoff announcements from the time period of 1979-
1991.  Besides the market reaction, one of the main objectives of the study was 
to examine the effectiveness of the layoff and whether it increases the efficiency 
of the firm and its labor force.   
The immediate market reaction to corporate layoffs around the announcement 
date shows how investors have interpreted the information in the announce-
ment itself, but it’s often difficult or misleading to judge the effectiveness of the 
layoff and the following firm performance in general by just this information. If 
the firm’s management acts in the best interest of shareholders, it will proceed 
with a layoff if the present value of the expected cash savings associated with 
the layoff exceeds the present value of the cash benefits associated with keeping 
the workers. If investors misinterpret how the layoff will affect the firm’s value, 
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stock prices may decline at the announcement, even if the decision to lay off 
employees has a positive net present value and it is an effective method to in-
crease the efficiency of the firm. (Elayan et al. 1998.) 
In the study by Elayan et al. (1998) three measures were used to examine the 
effectiveness of the layoffs and the time frame consisted of a 5-year period (two 
years prior to and two years after the announcement year). Firm’s return on 
equity was compared against industry-average in the post-announcement pe-
riod relative to the pre-announcement period to measure the efficiency of the 
firm. Net income per employee ratio was used to measure the contribution of 
the employee to the profitability of the firm and sales per employee ratio to 
measure the contribution of the employee to total sales. The results suggested 
that corporate layoffs increased the efficiency of the firms significantly as meas-
ured by return on equity and seemed to affect the labor force in a similar way 
according to the net income per employee and sales per employee ratios over 
the post-announcement period.   
Similar results were also found by Chen, Mehrotra, Sivakumar and Yu (2001). 
The study based on 349 layoff announcements from the U.S. market between 
the time period of 1990-1995. Clear evidence was found that layoff firms’ finan-
cial performance improved in the years following the layoff. Operating perfor-
mance, profit margins and labor productivity (sales per employee) were accele-
rated in the three subsequent years after the layoff announcements and these 
measures were on a higher level with the layoff firms than with their industry 
peers.  
Chalos and Chen (2002) studied the market reaction and post-announcement 
financial performance through different employee downsizing strategies of the 
Fortune 500 firms in the U.S. during the years 1993-1995. All together, the sam-
ple consisted of 365 firms, which downsized almost one million people over the 
three-year period. The financial performance was tested in the sample group by 
examining different financial ratios2 in a three-year post-announcement period.  
                                               
2 The five tested financial ratios consisted of operating cash flow/number of employees (OPCF), 
cost of goods sold/number of employees (COGS), sales/number of employees (SALES), long 
term debt/assets (DEBT) and income before extraordinary items /assets (ROA). 
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The employee downsizing strategies were divided into revenue refocusing, cost 
cutting and plant closing strategies (see DeWitt 1998). Revenue refocusing em-
phasizes the firm’s core competencies. Unprofitable and unrelated products, as 
well as units and divisions beyond the firm’s area of expertise, are all candi-
dates for divestiture, which indicates at least partial layoffs for the firms. A cost 
cutting strategy maintains the firm’s product scope and focuses on productivity 
gains and cost reduction. The study suggested that cost reduction often occurs 
with a temporal lag because of institutional politics, lack of knowledge and/or 
poor management. Cost reduction may be indiscriminate or at worst misplaced 
and short-term cost savings may be realized at the expense of long-term profit-
ability. Third downsizing strategy, plant closure, may be efficient, when firms 
have over-invested in plant capacity or if closure eliminates inefficiently scaled 
plants. In the long-term, future cash flows may increase due to fewer employees 
and less property, factories and equipment relative to output. (Chalos & Chen 
2002.) 
The study by Chalos and Chen (2002) concluded that revenue refocusing and 
cost cutting downsizing strategies improved the financial performance of the 
sample firms in the three-year period following the announcements. Plant clos-
ing strategy did not have a significant improvement in the financial perfor-
mance. Evidence revealed that revenue refocusing firms improved financial 
performance to a greater extent than cost cutting firms over the three-year post-
announcement period. The research results in the study suggested the plant 
closing to be purely a reactive downsizing strategy, confirmed by subsequent 
financial performance in which plant closing firms significantly under-
performed both revenue refocusing and cost cutting firms.  
 
2.3 Layoff characteristics 
There are various characteristics that should be taken into consideration, when 
firms’ layoff announcements are reviewed. In this part of the chapter some of 
the important factors of layoffs are presented to build basis for further research 
in this thesis. Some of the following characteristics have been partly described 
within previously reviewed research papers, but this part focuses more closely 
on these factors. The proactive/reactive and the cited reasons for layoffs have 
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been thoroughly presented in the previous parts of this chapter, so these charac-
teristics are not included in this part.  
2.3.1 Business cycle  
Since the layoffs have become more popular over the past decades, layoffs are 
not considered to be only tools for economic downturns, but also for the times 
of economic expansion. It is assumed that layoffs and their causes are a function 
of the business cycle (Elayan et al. 1998). It is important to take notice of the 
business cycle when observing layoffs from different sample periods. Farber 
and Hallock (2009) reported that the number of layoff announcements seems to 
follow the business cycle quite closely. In the study, the number of layoff an-
nouncements was compared with the annual unemployment rate in the U.S. 
between 1970 and 1999, and this indicated that layoffs were on a higher level 
during recessionary periods and on a lower level during non-recessionary pe-
riods.  
The study by Ursel and Armstrong-Stassen (1995), which was previously re-
viewed in this chapter, considered that different business cycles affect the reac-
tions of layoffs in different ways. The study suggested that layoffs during reces-
sions may be viewed positively, as a sign that companies are attempting to re-
duce costs, whereas layoffs in non-recessions may indicate that the firm is in 
serious difficulty.  
On the other hand, the study by Elayan et al. (1998) regarded that the firms an-
nouncing layoffs during economic contraction expect lower earnings and bad 
performance, which can be viewed negatively. In addition, the study concluded 
that layoffs during the period of expansion of business activities may be consi-
dered as an attempt to increase the firms’ efficiency. This contradicts the point 
of view of Ursel and Armstrong-Stassen (1995) and gives further information 
about the mixed results in different research papers. Therefore, it can be con-
cluded that there cannot be a generalized outcome for layoffs in different busi-
ness cycles, but the focus is on the announced reason for layoffs regardless of 
the business cycle (see Palmon et al. 1997). The differing amount of layoff an-
nouncements in different cycles of the economy is the second point of view, 
which should be focused on, since recessions tend to increase layoff announce-
ments.  
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2.3.2 Size and industry type 
It has been stated in many previous studies that the magnitude of the layoff is 
directly related to the magnitude of the market reaction (Worrell et al. 1991; Ur-
sel & Armstrong-Stassen 1995; Lee 1997). In other words, it can be noted that 
the larger the amount of employees laid off compared to the company’s entire 
workforce, the larger the market reaction to the layoff announcement. Accord-
ing to Lee (1997), the magnitude of a layoff conveys a signal about the severity 
of the firm’s problems. Additionally, larger layoffs accompany additional costs 
including severance pay entitlements, high unemployment taxes, and extended 
health benefits (Lee 1997).  
Large companies that announce layoffs tend to have a larger stock price reac-
tion than small companies (Worrell et al. 1991). This might be due to the fact 
that large company stocks are more intensely followed in the stock market and 
the trading volumes of these stocks are larger than with small company stocks.  
The market reaction to layoff announcement may depend on the nature of the 
industry group in which the firm is operating and whether the firm belongs to a 
manufacturing or a service industry. A service firm relies more heavily on hu-
man capital than physical capital. This implies that an alteration in human capi-
tal should have a greater effect on the value of the service firms relative to non-
service firms. (Elayan et al. 1998.)  
For companies, which have a large proportion of human capital in the work-
force, it is clearly more difficult to lay off workers, since workers with more 
competence and skills are more valuable for the company. The nature of the 
industry group for a service firm differs from that of a manufacturing firm. The 
industry differences of layoffs are important to understand within research stu-
dies and the diversification of firms into human and physical capital should be 
clearly taken notice of in further research.  
2.3.3 Permanent and temporary layoffs 
Permanent layoffs impact a larger stock price reaction than temporary layoffs. 
Permanent layoffs indicate enduring changes in the workforce and the firm’s 
competitive environment and temporary layoffs indicate changes that might be 
 25  
affected by seasonal demand shifts and reactions to sudden events in the firm’s 
economic circumstances. It is clear that permanent layoffs have a larger reaction 
in the firm value and stock price, since permanent layoffs are largely the result 
of long-term changes in a firm, while temporary layoffs represent an alternative 
to quick cost-cutting. (Worrell et al. 1991; Lee 1997; Elayan et al. 1998.)  
2.3.4 Single announcement vs. multiple announcements 
It is reported in the previous research studies that the first layoff announcement 
or a single layoff announcement has the largest impact in the stock price reac-
tion and the subsequent or following layoffs result in relatively smaller reac-
tions (Ursel & Armstrong-Stassen 1995; Lee 1997; Elayan et al. 1998). Multiple 
announcements may signal that the firm’s earlier layoffs were insufficient to 
generate a turnaround in the firm’s performance and, therefore, the subsequent 
layoff announcements indicate a need for further restructuring (Lee 1997).  
Firms with a recent history of layoffs, as evidenced by multiple layoff an-
nouncements during the sample period, are expected to be associated with less 
announcement effect than firms with a single layoff announcement (Elayan et al 
1998). The industry type must be taken into notice, when the sample is ob-
served for single or multiple announcements and the previously presented 
views of human and physical capital in the layoff firms are important points to 
keep in mind. 
 
2.4 Summary – layoff announcements and stock price reactions 
The table below (Table 1.) indicates that many of the previous research studies 
on layoff announcements and stock price reactions have found negative reac-
tions to these actions. Table 1. shows the nature of the short-term stock price 
reactions around the announcement day which have been found in the research 
papers reviewed in this chapter.  
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Table 1. Stock price reactions to layoff announcements in previous studies. 
Author(s) Market 
Sample 
period 
Sample 
size Cited reasons 
Positive 
reaction 
Negative 
reaction 
Worrell, David-
son & Sharma 
(1991) U.S. 1979-1987 194 Financial distress   X 
        Restructuring   X 
Lin & Rozeff 
(1993) U.S. 1978-1985 383 Declined demand   X 
        Pure efficiency     
Ursel & Arm-
strong-Stassen 
(1995) Canada 1989-1992 137     X 
              
Palmon, Sun & 
Tang (1997) U.S. 1982-1990 646 Declined demand   X 
        Improved efficiency X   
Kashefi & McKee 
(2002) U.S. 1992-1998 174 Financial distress   X 
        Restructuring X   
Lee (1997) U.S./Japan 1990-1994 373 Financial distress   X 
        Restructuring   X 
Brown & Ridge-
well (1998) U.S. 1980-1991 64     X 
              
Elayan, Swales, 
Maris & Scott 
(1998) U.S. 1979-1991 646 Declined demand   X 
        Efficiency   X 
Chalos & Chen 
(2002) U.S. 1993-1995 365 Revenue refocusing X   
        Cost cutting   X 
        Plant closing   X 
Chen, Mehrotra, 
Sivakumar & Yu 
(2001) U.S. 1990-1995 349 Declined demand   X 
        Restructuring   X 
McKnight, Low-
rie & Coles (2002)  U.K. 
1980-
1984,1990-
1995 235 Proactive   X 
        Reactive   X 
Hillier, Marshall, 
McColgan & 
Werema (2007)  U.K. 1990-2000 322 Proactive   X 
        Reactive X   
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3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter is based on the theoretical framework, which can be observed in 
the case of layoffs and stock prices. Layoffs present new information for the 
market and stock prices react to this information. The information content of 
layoff announcements and the role of information in the financial markets are 
important to understand before proceeding to further research. This chapter 
also presents the basic theories and studies on stock valuation and the line of 
research on value and growth stocks is observed as well to build more basis for 
the research results reviewed in the following chapters.  
 
3.1 The role of information in the financial markets 
Ever since Maurice Kendall proposed the theory of random walk in 1953, the 
role of information in the capital markets has been studied in a growing extent. 
The random walk theory suggests that there cannot be a predictable pattern in 
stock prices, which means that the stock prices are as likely to go up as they are 
to go down on any particular day, regardless of past performance. Therefore, 
the future movements of the stock prices cannot be predicted by their past 
movements.  
If stock prices are given all available information, it must be that they increase 
or decrease only in response to new information. New information, by defini-
tion, must be unpredictable. If it could be predicted, then the prediction would 
be part of today’s information. Thus stock prices that change in response to new 
(unpredictable) information also must move unpredictably. This is the essence 
of the argument that stock prices should follow random walk, that is, that price 
changes should be random and unpredictable. (Bodie, Kane & Marcus 2009: 
345.) 
In the case of layoff announcements, the new information can be regarded as 
the company’s announcement itself and the following reaction in the company’s 
stock price to a positive or negative direction is the reflection of new informa-
tion in the financial markets.  
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The information set in the financial markets is not mutual for all kinds of inves-
tors, but this information and the quality of information varies between the pro-
fessional and not-professional investors. This means that the market prices are 
not established by the consensus of all investors, but the marginal investors 
who actively trade in the markets. These well-informed and intelligent profes-
sionals exploit all available information, which is up-to-date and thoroughly 
processed before the initial trades, and lead the market to operate relatively ef-
ficiently. (Haugen 1997: 642-643.)  
This leads to the subject known in the research and the economic world as the 
efficient markets, markets where all information is efficiently priced in the se-
curities.  
3.1.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis 
One of the most important theories concerning the information value of the fi-
nancial markets is the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), which was commonly 
introduced by Eugene Fama in 1965. An efficient market is defined as a market 
where there are large numbers of rational, profit-maximizing investors actively 
competing, with each trying to predict future market values of individual secur-
ities, and where important current information is almost freely available to all 
market participants. In an efficient market, competition among the many intel-
ligent participants leads to a situation where, at any point in time, actual prices 
of individual securities already reflect the effects of information based both on 
events that have already occurred and on events, which the market expects to 
take place in the future. 
As stated, a market in which prices always “fully reflect” available information 
is called efficient. The market efficiency can be divided into three different 
forms of efficiency. These three subsets of relevant information for the adjust-
ment of security prices are the weak, semi-strong and strong form of market efficien-
cy. (Fama 1970.) 
The three levels of market efficiency are distinguished by the degree of informa-
tion reflected in security prices. In the first level, the weak form of market effi-
ciency, prices reflect the information contained in the record of past prices (his-
torical information). If the markets are efficient in the weak sense, then it is im-
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possible to make consistently superior profits by studying past returns. Prices 
will follow a random walk. The second level of efficiency, the semi-strong form 
of market efficiency, requires that prices reflect not just past prices but all other 
published information. If the markets are efficient in this sense, then prices will 
adjust immediately to public information such as the announcement of last 
quarter’s earnings, a new issue of stock, a proposal to merge two companies, 
and so on. (Brealey & Myers 2003: 351.) 
Finally, the strong form of market efficiency states that stock prices reflect all 
information relevant to the firm, even including information available only to 
company insiders (Bodie et al. 2009: 349).  
The strong form of the efficient market hypothesis takes the notion of market 
efficiency to the ultimate extreme. Under this form, those who acquire inside or 
private information act on it, buying or selling the stock. Their actions affect the 
price of the stock, and the price quickly adjusts to reflect the inside information. 
(Haugen 1997: 644.) The following figure (Figure 1.) shows how the different 
forms of market efficiency include all relevant information content in the mar-
ket.  
 
The notion of informationally efficient markets leads to a powerful research 
methodology. If security prices reflect all currently available information, then 
semi-strong form 
weak form 
strong form 
Figure 1. Three different forms of market efficiency. 
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price changes must reflect new information. Therefore, it seems that one should 
be able to measure the importance of an event of interest by examining price 
changes during the period in which the event occurs. An event study describes a 
technique of empirical financial research that enables an observer to assess the 
impact of a particular event on a firm’s stock price. Isolating the part of a stock 
price movement that is attributable to a specific event is not a trivial exercise.  
(Bodie et al. 2009: 353-354.)  
An important term used in various research studies is the term of abnormal re-
turn. The general approach for an event study starts with a proxy for what the 
stock’s return would have been in the absence of the event. The abnormal re-
turn due to the event is estimated as the difference between the stock’s actual 
return and this benchmark. (Bodie et al. 2009: 354.)  
Event studies produce useful evidence on how stock prices respond to informa-
tion (Fama 1998). In the wide range of studies of layoff announcements and 
stock price reactions, most of the empirical results and study evidence have 
been examined with event studies. More closely, the studies have contracted a 
so called event window, in which the initial announcement or part of a series of 
announcements for layoffs and the following stock price reaction have been ob-
served under a specified time-frame.  The event study methodology and further 
terminology will be examined later in this thesis.  
3.1.2 Testing the forms of market efficiency 
Early tests of efficient markets were tests of the weak form. Could speculators 
find trends in past prices that would enable them to earn abnormal profits? This 
is essentially a test of the efficacy of technical analysis, discerning trends in 
stock prices. The tests for the weak form of market efficiency try to observe a 
pattern in the past prices for stocks. (Bodie et al. 2009: 349, 359.) 
Fundamental analysis uses a much wider range of information than technical 
analysis. Investigations of the efficacy of fundamental analysis ask whether 
publicly available information beyond the trading history of a security can be 
used to improve investment performance, and therefore are tests of semi-strong 
form market efficiency. Fundamental analysis uses earnings and dividend 
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prospects of the firm, expectations of future interest rates, and risk evaluation of 
the firm to determine proper stock prices. (Bodie et al. 2009: 350,361.) 
The testing of strong form market efficiency is more problematic, since insider 
trading is legally prohibited and closely monitored in the course of law. It 
would not be surprising if insiders were able to make superior profits trading in 
their firm’s stock. Insider information and the possible trades made by insiders 
are regulated and limited in the markets and, therefore, it is not expected that 
the markets would be strong form efficient. (Bodie et al. 2009:365-366.) 
If the markets would fully reflect all available information, various types of in-
vestment analysis would become ineffective in discriminating between profita-
ble and unprofitable investments. It is important to understand the following 
assumptions on the testing of the different forms of market efficiency. If the 
weak form of market efficiency is valid, technical analysis or charting becomes 
ineffective. There is no information in the past series which is useful in predict-
ing the future and the stock prices have settled to a level which reflects all the 
useful information embedded in past stock prices. (Haugen 1997: 644.)  
If the semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis is in effect, the fun-
damental analysis as well as technical analysis is useless in predicting future 
stock prices. All published information is fully reflected in the stock prices and 
there’s a need for uncovering or purchasing of private information to unveil the 
future directions for the stocks. In the case of strong form market efficiency, 
those who acquire inside information act on it and quickly force the price to 
reflect the information. Allegedly, the initial acquisition of new pieces of this 
information is largely a matter of chance, and since stock prices already reflect 
the existing inventory of inside information, efforts to seek out inside informa-
tion to beat the market are ill-advised. (Haugen 1997: 644.)  
These assumptions partly claim that all analysis for predicting future prices is 
useless and even the professional investors should closely follow a rather pas-
sive than active investing strategy. All assumptions aside, the financial markets 
are only partly efficient and the efficient market hypothesis provides only a 
theoretical framework for understanding the role of information in the financial 
markets.  
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The market efficiency and the information content in the financial markets can 
be examined also in the case of layoff announcements and stock prices. Accord-
ing to Ursel and Armstrong-Stassen (1995), a company’s prior history with 
layoffs can lead to investor anticipation for a forthcoming layoff announcement. 
For example, a forest industry company with an active layoff history can lead 
the investors to observe the historical stock prices around the company’s layoff 
announcements and draw conclusions from the previous stock price reactions 
to anticipate a negative or a positive stock price reaction to the forthcoming an-
nouncement. Also the financial figures can be observed for the company to spe-
culate the stock price performance following a layoff announcement. Prior his-
torical information leads the investors to anticipate or analyze the future 
movements and this proves a test for the weak and semi-strong form of market 
efficiency, since technical and fundamental analysis can be assigned for the ba-
sis of the investment decision.  
Worrell et al. (1991) report information leakages on layoff announcements and 
stock price reactions to this information before the initial layoff announcement 
and conclude that the market adjusts efficiently to this information. Filbeck and 
Webb (2001) report information asymmetries in layoffs and stock price reac-
tions indicating that managerial, insider ownership relative to firm size may 
guide the investor’s perceptions of layoff announcements. Therefore, the study 
suggests that small firms’ layoff announcements contain a larger amount of 
new information than those of large firms, and results indicate a stronger reac-
tion to this information.  
Even though, the markets are stated to be only relatively efficient, the markets 
are efficient enough to reflect the new information into the stock prices in the 
weak and semi-strong form (Fama 1970). This thesis focuses on the new infor-
mation presented in company layoff announcements and how these events af-
fect the stock prices.  
 
3.2 Stock valuation 
On the basis of the previously presented efficient market hypothesis, it can be 
concluded that the finding of undervalued securities is hardly easy. It is the on-
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going search for mispriced securities that maintains a nearly efficient market. 
The purpose of fundamental analysis is to identify stocks that are mispriced 
relative to some measure of “true” value that can be derived from observable 
financial data. (Bodie et al. 2009: 586.) This part of the chapter focuses on the 
basic stock valuation techniques used in the fundamental analysis. The stock 
valuation models presented in this part of the chapter are the dividend discount 
model and free cash flow model. The stock valuation ratios presented here are 
the price-to-earnings, price-to-book and price-to-cash flow ratios. These ratios 
build basis for reviewing the differences between value and growth stocks in 
the end of this part.  
3.2.1 Stock valuation models 
A valuation model identifies the features of a firm’s operations that generate 
returns so that forecasting those features amounts to forecasting returns. And it 
shows how to convert a forecast into a valuation that anticipates abnormal re-
turns. A valuation model is a thinking tool for understanding the business, 
management’s strategic plan, and the likely result of that plan. And it translates 
these features into what is of ultimate interest to the investor, expected returns 
and the value of the investment. Valuation models provide the design for fun-
damental analysis. (Penman 2001: 96.) 
The stock valuation models are based on the calculation of present values of the 
future cash flows that investors are expected to earn from the investment. The 
basic idea is to pay attention to the time value of money. The return of the in-
vestment depends on the future cash flows of the company and, therefore, in-
vestor does not know for certain, what this return is going to be. (Nikkinen, Ro-
thovius & Sahlström 2005: 148.) 
Predicting these future cash flows of the stock are one of the most important 
tasks, when the stock valuation models are applied (Nikkinen et al. 2005: 149). 
Because these cash flows are expected in the future, they are adjusted by a dis-
count rate to reflect not only the time value of money but also the riskiness of the 
cash flows (Sharpe, Alexander & Bailey 1995: 568-569).  
The cash payoff to owners of common stocks comes in two forms, cash divi-
dends and capital gains or losses. At each point in time all stocks in an equiva-
 34  
lent risk class are priced to offer the same expected return. Suppose that the 
current price of a share is P0, that the expected price at the end of a year is P1, 
and that the expected dividend per share is D1. The rate of return that investors 
expect from this share over the next year is defined as the expected dividend 
per share D1 plus the expected price appreciation per share P1 – P0, all divided 
by the price at the start of the year P0. (Brealey & Myers 2003: 61-62.) The fol-
lowing equation (1) shows how the expected return, r, is formed. 
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Because the cash flows associated with an investment in any particular common 
stock are the dividends that are expected to be paid throughout the future on 
the shares purchased, the models suggested by this method of valuation are 
often known as dividend discount models (Sharpe et al. 1995: 570). A simple divi-
dend discount model can be described as follows in the equation (2).  The mod-
el in the equation (2) states that the value of the stock, P0, is the present value of 
the company’s future dividends, Dt, discounted with the expected (required) 
rate of return, r (Nikkinen et al. 2005: 150). 
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In order to use this equation, the investor must forecast all future dividends. 
Because a common stock does not have a fixed lifetime, this suggests that an 
infinitely long stream of dividends must be forecast. Although this may seem to 
be an impossible task, with the addition of certain assumptions, the equation 
can be made usable. These assumptions center on dividend growth rates. The 
different types of tractable dividend discount models reflect different sets of 
assumptions about dividend growth rates. (Sharpe et al. 1995: 571.) 
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One assumption that could be made about future dividends is that they will 
remain at a fixed amount. This is equivalent to assuming that all the dividend 
growth rates are zero. This model is often referred to as the zero-growth model.  
(Sharpe et al. 1995: 571.)  
If it assumed that the amount of dividends is fixed and, therefore, the growth 
rate is zero, the equation (2) can be contracted to the following equation (3). 
(Nikkinen et al. 2005: 150.) 
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The constant growth model assumes that dividends will grow from period to pe-
riod at the same rate forever (Sharpe et al. 1995: 573). The dividends will grow 
at a constant rate, g, in the future and the equation (4) can be formed as follows 
(Nikkinen et al. 2005: 150).  
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According to the equation (4), the stock price can be derived with dividing the 
next year’s dividends with the difference between the expected return and the 
dividend growth rate. Even though, the growth rate for dividends is rarely con-
stant, this model gives important evidence how different factors affect the stock 
price. An increase in the expected return decreases the stock price and, to the 
same extent, an increase in the growth rate increases the stock price. (Nikkinen 
et al. 2005: 150.) 
There’s certain problems with using dividend discount models, even though, 
the models are highly applicable in stock valuation. The biggest problems with 
these models are caused by the fact that the dividend policies in different com-
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panies vary across industries and sectors and that the faster growing companies 
usually give smaller dividends in the near future related to the stock price. The 
estimation of dividends for faster growth companies is problematic and in-
creases the uncertainty related with the future valuation. (Nikkinen et al. 2005: 
151.)  
An alternative approach to the dividend discount model values the firm using 
free cash flow, that is, cash flow available to the firm or its equityholders net of 
capital expenditures. This approach is particularly useful for firms that pay no 
dividends, for which the dividend discount model would be difficult to imple-
ment. These free cash flow models may be applied to any firm and can provide 
useful insights about the firm value beyond the dividend discount models. (Bo-
die et al. 2009: 611-612.) 
The following equation (5) describes the free cash flow available to equityhold-
ers (Bodie et al. 2009:612). 
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where  EBIT= Earnings before interest and taxes 
 tc= the corporate tax rate 
 D= Depreciation 
 CE= Capital expenditures 
 NWC= increase in net working capital 
 IE= Interest expense 
 Debt+= Increases in net debt 
 
After defining the free cash flow to equity, the market value of the equity can be 
calculated by discounting the present values of free cash flows with the re-
quired returns for each year. The equation for the market value of the equity, 
PE, can be described as follows. (Nikkinen et al. 2005: 153.) 
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In practice, the free cash flow model is applicable in the same way as the pre-
viously presented dividend discount model. First, the future cash flows are fo-
recasted, and then the cash flows are assumed to grow at a constant rate forev-
er. There are certain problems with using free cash flow models as well. Espe-
cially, in the case of fast-growing companies, whose free cash flows may be 
negative for long periods, the forecasting is difficult and hard to manage. Simi-
lar problems can be noticed in the companies with large investment projects, 
when the amount of free cash flow varies considerably between different years. 
Therefore, the free cash flow model functions most efficiently, when it can be 
assumed that the company’s free cash flows are constantly growing from year 
to year and the investment projects stay at relatively constant levels in the 
forthcoming years. (Nikkinen et al. 2005: 153-154.) 
3.2.2 Stock valuation ratios 
The price-to-earnings ratio (equation 7) is the ratio of price per share to company 
earnings per share, commonly called the P/E ratio (Bodie et al. 2009: 604). The 
price-to-earnings ratio is computed on the basis of earnings available for distri-
bution to common stockholders, that is, after deducting operating expenses, 
depreciation, taxes, and interest from net revenue (Haugen 1997: 607-608).  
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The P/E ratio is considered to be one of the most common stock valuation tools 
and it provides important knowledge for investors about the firm’s future 
prospects. The P/E ratio might serve as a useful indicator of expectations of 
growth opportunities and the differences in expected growth opportunities are 
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responsible for differences in P/E ratios across firms. The P/E ratio actually is a 
reflection of the market’s optimism concerning a firm’s growth prospects. The 
P/E ratios are commonly taken as proxies for the expected growth in dividends 
or earnings. (Bodie et al. 2009: 604, 606.) 
As in other stock valuation techniques, also the P/E ratio has some pitfalls. First, 
it is to be considered that the denominator in the P/E ratio is accounting earn-
ings, which are influenced by somewhat arbitrary accounting rules such as the 
use of historical cost in depreciation and inventory valuation. In times of high 
inflation, historic cost depreciation and inventory costs will tend to under-
represent true economic values, because the replacement cost of both goods and 
capital equipment will rise with the general level of prices. (Bodie et al. 2009: 
607-608.) 
Earnings management is the practice of using flexibility in accounting rules to 
improve the apparent profitability of the firm (Bodie et al. 2009: 608). This 
means that the earnings might be speculated to look better to improve the 
firm’s figures in the eyes of the investors.  
Another confounding factor in the use of P/E ratios is related to the business 
cycle. The reported earnings can fluctuate dramatically around a trend line over 
the business cycle and current accounting earnings can differ considerably from 
future economic earnings. Because ownership of the stock conveys the right to 
future as well as current earnings, the ratio of price to most recent earnings can 
vary substantially over the business cycle, as accounting earnings and the trend 
value of economic earnings diverge by greater and lesser amounts. (Bodie et al. 
2009: 609.) 
Another stock valuation ratio observed in this thesis is the price-to-book ratio3 
(P/B –ratio). This is the ratio of price per share divided by book value per share 
(Bodie et al. 2009: 611). The P/B ratio is a commonly used comparative valuation 
ratio and it is used in a similar way as P/E ratio in stock valuation. The stock 
price represents the investors’ assessments of future prospects, while its book 
value represents accountants’ representation of its past costs; the greater a com-
                                               
3 Also known as the market-to-book ratio 
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pany’s prospects for future growth, the greater should be the ratio of its future 
prospects to its embedded costs (Capaul, Rowley & Sharpe 1993). 
Book value per share is stockholders’ book equity divided by the number of 
shares outstanding. Book equity equals common stock plus retained earnings – 
the net amount that the firm has received from stockholders or reinvested on 
their behalf. (Brealey & Myers 2003: 830.) 
Using the book value in stock valuation is based on the idea that firm’s value is 
at least the value of equity in the firm. There are some difficulties in the price-
to-book ratio as well. The forecasting of the exact value of a firm is difficult, 
when matters, such as patents, technological competence and human capital 
should be taken into consideration in the valuation. (Nikkinen et al. 2005: 143.) 
The third stock valuation ratio reviewed is the price-to-cash-flow ratio (P/CF ra-
tio). This is the ratio of price per share divided by the cash flow per share. The 
information content and analysis of P/CF ratio is similar to P/E ratio and P/CF 
ratio is at times used to support the P/E ratio (Nikkinen et al. 2005: 145).  
Earnings as reported on the income statement can be affected by the company’s 
choice of accounting practices, and thus are commonly viewed as subject to 
some imprecision and even manipulation. In contrast, cash flow – which tracks 
cash actually flowing into or out of the firm – is less affected by accounting de-
cisions. As a result, some analysts prefer to use the ratio of price to cash flow 
per share rather than price to earnings per share. Some analysts use operating 
cash flow when calculating this ratio and others prefer using the free cash flow 
(see equation 5).  (Bodie et al. 2009: 611.) 
3.2.3 The difference between value and growth 
Value stocks are those with low ratios of market price per share to various meas-
ures of value, for example low values of the previously presented P/E, P/B and 
P/CF ratios. In contrast, growth stocks have high ratios, suggesting that investors 
in these firms must believe that the firm will experience rapid growth to justify 
the prices at which the stocks sell. (Bodie et al. 2009: 107.) 
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Value stocks have low values for the ratios, because the cash flows of value 
stocks are expected to grow relatively slowly in the future. Thus, investors are 
not willing to pay a relatively high price for these stocks today. With growth 
stocks, investors are willing to pay a relatively high price for the stocks, since it 
is expected that the cash flows grow fast to higher levels in the future. (Haugen 
1997:177.) 
The classification of stocks into value and growth is widely known in the world 
of financial markets and research studies have reviewed the value-growth ef-
fects in a growing extent ever since the 1970s. Basu (1977) presented evidence 
that low P/E stocks tend to have higher average returns than high P/E stocks 
and, therefore, value stocks outperform growth stocks. Similar research evi-
dence was presented by Fama and French (1992, 1995) and by Lakonishok, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1994) with low P/B ratios and P/CF ratios.  
Research has shown that value stocks have earned much higher rates of return 
than growth stocks in recent decades. The source of these higher returns is the 
subject of much controversy. Some believe that value stocks are “fallen angels” 
and therefore are more risky. The premium returns to these stocks are expected 
and required. Others believe that the premium returns to value stocks are un-
expected and systematically come as a surprise to investors. It is therefore re-
garded that investors overreact to the past records of success and failure by 
firms. (Haugen 1997: 177.) 
Value stocks are sometimes regarded as economic distress stocks, since these 
stocks react more negatively than growth stocks in poor economic conditions 
and are therefore riskier than growth stocks, at least during recessionary cycles 
of the economy. In bad times, firms want to scale down, especially value firms 
that are less productive than growth firms (see Fama & French 1995). Because 
scaling down is more difficult, value firms are more adversely affected by eco-
nomic downturns. In good times, growth firms face less flexibility because they 
tend to invest more. Expanding is less urgent for value firms because their pre-
viously unproductive assets have become more productive. (Petkova & Zhang 
2005.)  
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4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter the data and methodology related to this study are presented 
and specified in a more detailed way. It is important to clarify the data sources 
and the event study methodology as well as some of the problems involved 
with conducting event studies before heading into the empirical results found 
in the course of this study.  
 
4.1 Data sources and sample construction 
The data for this study consists of 160 announcements for permanent layoffs in 
Finland between January 2004 and June 2010. The companies observed are Fin-
nish large and mid-sized companies listed in the Nasdaq OMX Helsinki Stock 
Exchange. The daily stock market data and the financial ratios for the layoff 
firms were obtained from the Thomson One Banker Analytics Database pro-
vided by the University Of Vaasa. Nasdaq OMX Helsinki Stock Exchange, Ar-
vopaperi Online and Kauppalehti Online news databases were used for search-
ing the company announcements for the layoffs and the company announce-
ments were browsed through to define the reasons and size for the permanent 
layoffs.  
This study focuses on the stock market reaction for the final disclosure of per-
manent layoffs, indicating the announcement for the final decision of the com-
pany co-determination negotiations. Therefore, this study concentrates on the 
reaction of the stock market to the actual layoffs rather than only to the layoff 
announcements. An 11-day event window is constructed around the final an-
nouncement day, when the company co-determination negotiations are dis-
closed and an estimation period of 200 days preceding the event window simi-
lar to Worrell et al. (1991) is used for calculating the mean-adjusted abnormal 
returns. The original data sample of 184 permanent layoff announcements from 
Finland between the years 2004-2010 was adjusted for confounding events, 
mainly for overlapping event windows for the same company or large an-
nouncements for different corporate events around the initial event day. This 
study does not take the differences between single and multiple announce-
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ments for the firms into account and this can be regarded as one of the limita-
tions for the research.  
The sample of 160 announcements for permanent layoffs was divided into dif-
ferent sub-samples according to the cited reason for layoffs and the P/B ratios. 
The cited reasons stated in the company announcements for the permanent 
layoffs were used to divide the sample into declining demand and improved 
efficiency sub-sample groups similar to Palmon et al. (1997). These sub-samples 
consisted of 103 declining demand layoffs and 57 improved efficiency layoffs. 
In a different sample formation stage the total sample was divided into value 
and growth sub-samples according to the P/B ratios for the firms’ layoff an-
nouncement year and this sample formation was implemented for two different 
business cycles. The non-recessionary period of 2004 –2007 consisted of 66 
layoff announcements, which were divided into 33 layoff announcements for 
the value sub-sample and, respectively, into 33 layoff announcements for the 
growth sub-sample based on the median P/B ratio. The recessionary period be-
tween the years 2008 and 2010 consisted of 94 layoff announcements with 47 in 
the value sub-sample and similar amount in the growth sub-sample.  
 
4.2 Event study methodology 
An important methodological approach to market based empirical research in 
finance and accounting is the event study. Also known by other names such as 
residual analysis and abnormal performance index tests, these studies involve 
the analysis of security price behavior around the time of an information an-
nouncement or event. The approach has been used to study a variety of events 
such as the announcements of annual accounting earnings, accounting principle 
changes, large block trades and corporate mergers. (Bowman 1983.) 
The usefulness of an event study comes from the fact, that given rationality in 
the marketplace, the effect of an event will be reflected immediately in asset 
prices. Thus the event’s economic impact can be measured using asset prices 
observed over a relatively short time period. In contrast, direct measures may 
require many months or even years of observation. The general applicability of 
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the event study methodology has led to its wide use. (Campbell, Lo & MacKin-
lay 1997: 149.) 
Ever since the 1960s, event studies have become more and more popular among 
financial research studies and the framework for event studies, which was pre-
sented by the pioneering research studies by Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama, 
Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969), can still be applied efficiently in today’s research 
studies.  
4.2.1 The structure of an event study 
It is important to review the structure of an event study briefly before heading 
into the more detailed parts of an event study process. In the following figure 
(Figure 2.) the structure of an event study can be separated into seven different 
steps (Campbell et al. 1997: 151-152).  
1. Event definition 
2. Selection criteria 
3. Normal and abnormal returns 
4. Estimation procedure 
5. Testing procedure 
6. Empirical results 
7. Interpretation and conclusions 
Figure 2. The structure of an event study. 
The initial task of conducting an event study is to define the event of interest 
and identify the period over which the security prices of firms involved in this 
event will be examined – the event window (Campbell et al. 1997:151). An impor-
tant point in identifying an event of interest concerns the ability to ascertain the 
timing of the event (Bowman 1983). For the timing of the event, the initial event 
day for this study is the final disclosure day for the firms’ permanent layoff an-
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nouncements and an 11–day event window is used to observe the stock price 
reactions to these events.  
Another important consideration in the choosing and defining of an event is the 
problem presented by confounding events. Confounding events will frequently 
exist in event studies. Their presence can have a significant impact on the re-
sults of empirical tests. The success of many event studies will depend upon 
how effectively the researcher controls for the impact of confounding events. 
(Bowman 1983.) 
After identifying the event of interest, it is necessary to determine the selection 
criteria for the inclusion of a given firm in the study (Campbell 1997: 151). This 
indicates that there are certain restrictions to be made for the data sample, in 
order to clarify the selection criteria. In a way, the precise definition of the selec-
tion criteria can be seen as controlling for the impact of confounding events 
and, therefore, the restrictions made for the data sample can enhance the empir-
ic results. The restrictions are usually linked with the selection of country, stock 
exchange or membership in a specific industry which is under review in the 
event study (see Campbell et al. 1991:151).  
After defining the event and selecting the criteria for the event, abnormal re-
turns for the event are calculated. In this part of the event study process the ac-
tual and expected returns4 are compared and the stock price reactions are mod-
eled with the chosen statistical or economical models to measure the expected 
performance5. The models for measuring the expected performance are pre-
sented later in this chapter.  
The expected return is defined as the return that would be expected if the event 
did not take place (Campbell et al. 1997:151). The following equation (Equation 
8.) describes how the abnormal return ( itAR ) for each firm i at event day t is cal-
culated:  
 
(8)  ititit ERRAR  , 
                                               
4 In the Campbell et al. (1997) the term used is normal return. 
5 In the Campbell et al. (1997) the term used is normal performance. 
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where itAR = the abnormal return for firm i at the event day t  
 itR = the actual return for firm i at the event day t 
 itER  = the expected return for firm i at the event day t 
Once the expected performance model has been selected, the parameters of the 
model must be estimated using a subset of the data known as the estimation pe-
riod. The most common choice is to use the period prior to the event window for 
the estimation window. It is typical for the estimation window and the event 
window not to overlap. This design provides estimators for the parameters of 
the expected return model which are not influenced by the event-related re-
turns. Including the event window in the estimation of the expected model pa-
rameters could lead to the event returns having a large influence on the ex-
pected return measure. In this situation both the expected returns and the ab-
normal returns would reflect the impact of the event. (Campbell et al. 1997: 152, 
158.) 
With the parameter estimates for the expected performance model, the abnor-
mal returns can be calculated. Next comes the design for the testing framework 
for the abnormal returns. Important considerations are defining the null hypo-
thesis and determining the techniques for aggregating the individual firm ab-
normal returns. The presentation of the empirical results follows the formula-
tion of the econometric design. Ideally the empirical results will lead to insights 
relating to the understanding the sources and causes of the effects (or lack of 
effects) of the event under study. Additional analysis may be included to dis-
tinguish between competing explanations. (MacKinlay 1997.) 
4.2.2 Models for measuring the expected and abnormal returns 
A number of approaches are available to calculate the normal return of a given 
security. The approaches can be loosely grouped into two categories – statistical 
and economic. Models in the first category follow from statistical assumptions 
concerning the behavior of asset returns and do not depend on any economic 
arguments. In contrast, models in the second category rely on assumptions con-
cerning investors’ behavior and are not based solely on statistical assumptions. 
(Campbell et al. 1997: 154.) 
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In this study, the presented approaches for measuring the expected returns are 
statistical models – the mean-adjusted return model and market model. For the sta-
tistical models, the assumption that asset returns are jointly multivariate normal 
and independently and identically distributed through time is imposed. The 
distributional assumption is sufficient for the mean-adjusted return model and 
market model to be correctly specified. While this assumption is strong, in prac-
tice it generally does not lead to problems because the assumption is empirical-
ly reasonable and inferences using the expected return models tend to be robust 
to deviations from the assumption. (MacKinlay 1997.) 
In this thesis the selected model for measuring the expected returns is the 
mean-adjusted return model. The mean-adjusted return model uses the daily 
mean returns for the stock prices from the estimation period to obtain the ex-
pected return for each firm in the study. Therefore, the mean adjusted proce-
dure defines the expected return as the mean of past security returns (Bowman 
1983). The following equation (Equation 9.) describes how the mean-adjusted 
abnormal returns are calculated.  
 
(9)  iitit RRAR , 
 
where itAR = the abnormal return for firm i at the event day t  
 itR = the actual return for firm i at the event day t  
 iR = the expected mean-adjusted return
6 for firm i  
Even though, the mean-adjusted return model is a simple model for establish-
ing the expected and abnormal stock returns, Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) 
have suggested that it is as applicable as the more sophisticated and complex 
models, such as the market model. Their research found that the mean-adjusted 
return model often yielded results similar to those of more sophisticated mod-
els. This lack of sensitivity to the model choice can be attributed to the fact that 
the variance of the abnormal return is frequently not reduced much by choosing 
                                               
6 The simple average of firm i’s daily stock returns from the estimation period. 
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a more sophisticated model (Campbell et al. 1997: 154). Ahern (2009) suggests 
that simpler estimation procedures for measuring abnormal returns, such as the 
mean-adjusted return model, may indicate a mean bias, when the sample is se-
lected randomly across a wide variety of securities. This can be stated to be one 
of the risk factors involved with the mean-adjusted return model.  
The market model is a statistical model which relates the return of any given 
security to the return of the market portfolio. The model’s linear specification 
follows from the assumed joint normality of asset returns. (Campbell et al. 1997: 
155.)  
The expected return in the market model is calculated as follows (Equation 10.). 
The parameters of the model are estimated using ordinary least squares regres-
sion and then used to calculate the abnormal returns (Equation 11.).  
 
(10.)  itmtiiit RR , 
 
where itR = the expected return for firm i from the estimation period t 
 mtR = the market portfolio return from the estimation period t 
 i and i = parameters of the market model 
 it = the zero mean disturbance term 
  
(11.)  )( mtiiitit RRAR , 
 
where itAR = the abnormal return for firm i at the event day t  
 itR = the actual return for firm i at the event day t  
The abnormal return observations must be aggregated in order to draw overall 
inferences for the event of interest. The aggregation is along two dimensions – 
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through time and across securities. The cumulative abnormal return is intro-
duced to accommodate multiple sample intervals within the event window. The 
individual securities’ abnormal returns can be averaged by using the average 
abnormal return ( iAAR ). Given the sample of N  events, defining iAAR  as the 
sample average of the N  abnormal returns, the equation is constructed as fol-
lows (Equation 12.). (Campbell et al. 1997:160-161.) 
 
(12.)  
N
i
iti AR
N
AAR
1
1  
 
When the abnormal returns have been defined for all the individual firms in the 
sample, the procedure used widely in event studies is the observation of cumu-
lative abnormal returns through different time intervals in the event window. 
This procedure gives important knowledge of how the information value in the 
announcements affects the stock prices and is an efficient tool in observing the 
different time intervals around the event day. The cumulative average abnor-
mal returns are calculated by summing up the average abnormal returns for the 
event days across the sample. In the following equation (Equation 13.) the cu-
mulative average abnormal returns are calculated by summing up the average 
abnormal returns ( tCAAR ) for the 11-day time period (-5, +5) used in this study. 
In the absence of abnormal performance the expected value of tCAAR is equal to 
zero.  
 
(13.)  
5,5t
it AARCAAR  
 
The focus of the event studies is largely on the average and cumulative abnor-
mal returns rather than on the abnormal returns for single event days. The av-
erage and cumulative abnormal returns are better indicators, when the stock 
price reactions to an event are observed.  
 49  
4.2.3 Testing the significance of abnormal returns 
When the abnormal returns for the sample have been calculated, the results 
must be tested for significance. That is, to confirm if the abnormal returns can 
be considered relevant and significant under the hypotheses suggested. There 
are various ways of testing the statistics for the event study results and in this 
study the test statistics used are similar to the test statistics under the null hypo-
thesis as presented by Brown and Warner (1985).  
Given the abnormal returns based on each method, the statistical significance of 
the event period abnormal returns is assessed for each sample. The null hypo-
thesis tested is that the mean day zero abnormal return (e.g., the simple average 
of the mean-adjusted return model abnormal returns) is equal to zero, and thus 
concerns the average effect of an event on returns to shareholders. The test sta-
tistic is the ratio of the day zero mean abnormal return to its estimated standard 
deviation; the standard deviation is estimated from the time-series of mean ab-
normal returns. The test statistic for any event day t (in this case t = 0) is con-
structed as follows (Equation 14.). (Brown & Warner 1985.) 
 
(14.)  )(/ tt ARSAR , 
 
where  iitt RRAR  
199/)()( 2
6
205
t
t
itt RARARS
 
  iR = the expected mean-adjusted return for firm i 
If the tAR  are independent, identically distributed and normal, the test statistic 
is distributed Student-t under the null hypothesis. Since the degrees of freedom 
exceed 200, the test statistic is assumed unit normal. (Brown & Warner 1985.)  
The statistical analysis is based on the assumption that returns are jointly nor-
mal and temporally independently and identically distributed. The normality 
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assumption is important for the exact finite sample results to hold. Without as-
suming normality, all results would be asymptotic. (See MacKinlay 1997.)  
The null hypothesis test statistic suggests that the given event has no impact on 
the stock price reaction and, therefore, it tests the significance of the abnormal 
returns differing from zero. As mentioned, there are various different test statis-
tic models for measuring the significance and the form of abnormal returns in-
volved with event studies, but in this study the null hypothesis test is regarded 
as the model of choice.  
 
4.3 Problems with event studies 
Like in any other theoretical and empirical research methods, there are various 
different problems with conducting event studies as well. These issues include 
the role of the sampling interval, the uncertainty with the event-date and the 
possible biases with the assumptions and simplifications of event studies.  
First of all, the sampling interval should be taken into account, when conduct-
ing event studies. If the timing of an event is known precisely, then the ability 
to statistically identify the effect of the event will be higher for a shorter sam-
pling interval. The increase results from reducing the variance of the abnormal 
return without changing the mean. The clear message is that there is a substan-
tial payoff in terms of increased power from reducing the length of the event 
window. Secondly, in some studies it may be difficult to identify the exact event 
date. When the event announcement appears in the newspaper one cannot be 
certain if the market was informed before the close of the market the prior trad-
ing day. If this is the case then the prior day is the event day, if not, the current 
day is the event day. (Campbell et al. 1997: 175-176.)  
In this study, the event period has been restricted to 11 trading days around the 
event and the exact event date has been confirmed by browsing the Nasdaq 
OMX Helsinki Stock Exchange news releases and other up-to-date news arc-
hives for the official announcements.  
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Further problems involved with event studies concern the possible biases, 
which these studies are subject to. Nonsynchronous trading can introduce a 
bias. The nontrading or nonsynchronous trading effect arises when prices are 
taken to be recorded at time intervals of one length, when in fact they are rec-
orded at time intervals of other possibly irregular lengths. This causes bias es-
pecially for the market model parameter estimation. The methodology used to 
compute the cumulative abnormal returns can induce an upward bias. The bias 
arises from the observation by observation rebalancing to equal weights impli-
cit in the calculation of the aggregate cumulative abnormal return combined 
with the use of transaction prices which can represent both the bid and offer 
side of the market. (MacKinlay 1997.)  
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this chapter the empirical results regarding permanent layoffs and stock 
price reactions are presented. The analysis of stock price reactions to permanent 
layoff announcements is divided into three different parts, which are observed 
separately in this chapter. First part of this chapter focuses on the cited reasons 
mentioned by the layoff firms for the initial permanent layoff and the sample of 
160 layoff announcements is divided into declined demand and improved effi-
ciency subsamples based on the cited reason. In the second part, the value and 
growth dimension for the stock price reaction to permanent layoffs is observed 
and the sample is divided into value and growth subsamples in two different 
business cycles. In the last part of this chapter, the empirical results presented 
are obtained from ordinary-least-squares (OLS) regression, where the relation-
ship between the stock price reaction to layoff-to-employee ratio and firm size is 
under review in both recessionary and non-recessionary business cycle.  
 
5.1 Abnormal performance and the cited reason for layoffs 
The permanent layoffs are classified into two subsamples based on the reason 
for the layoff decision cited in the initial announcement for the disclosure of the 
layoffs. These two subsamples are the declined demand and improved efficien-
cy subsamples. This classification is similar to the classification used in the stu-
dies by Worrell et al. (1991), Lin and Rozeff (1993), Palmon et al. (1997) and Ka-
shefi and McKee (2002). The announcements of permanent layoff decisions that 
state declining sales, low product prices or poor business conditions in general 
as a reason for the layoff are grouped in the declined demand subsample, whe-
reas the announcements that indicate improved profitability or efficiency as the 
cited reason for the layoffs are grouped in the improved efficiency subsample.  
The declined demand subsample includes 103 permanent layoff announce-
ments from the years between 2004 until 2010 and the improved efficiency sub-
sample includes 57 permanent layoff announcements from the same time pe-
riod. The examples of the quoted reasons for the permanent layoff decisions are 
presented in the Appendix 1.  
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Table 2. Abnormal performance for the declined demand subsample. 
Daily average abnormal returns (AR), cumulative abnormal returns (CAAR) and t-statistics for 
the declined demand subsample of 103 permanent layoffs followed by the CAARs and t-
statistics measured for different event intervals. Day 0 is the event day for the initial announce-
ment for the disclosure of the permanent layoffs in the stock exchange and business news me-
dia. Standard two-sided t-test was used for testing the statistical significance of the abnormal 
returns. Symbols * (**, ***) indicate significance at the .10 (.05, .01) level using two-tailed test.  
t(day) AR 
  
CAAR 
  
t-statistic of AR 
    
-5 0,19 %   0,19 %   0,65   
-4 -0,08 %   0,11 %   -0,30   
-3 0,08 %   0,19 %   0,42   
-2 0,04 %   0,23 %   0,15   
-1 0,14 %   0,37 %   0,53   
0 0,13 %   0,50 %   0,51   
1 -0,04 %   0,46 %   -0,14   
2 0,38 %   0,84 %   1,41   
3 -0,39 %   0,45 %   -1,59   
4 0,49 % * 0,94 %   1,83   
5 0,17 %   1,11 %   0,73   
CAAR interval [-5,+5] [-5,-1] [-1,0] [-1,+1] [+1,+5]   
CAAR 1,11 % 0,37 % 0,27 % 0,23 % 0,61 %   
t-stat 1,33 0,56 0,72 0,58 1,12 
  
The results for the declined demand subsample (Table 2.) indicate that the stock 
price reaction to permanent layoffs due to declined demand is positive, but not 
significantly different from zero. The t-statistics for the declined demand sub-
sample show that the returns are not significantly different from zero, except 
for the day 4 abnormal return, which is significantly different from zero at the 
0,10 level. Therefore, it can be concluded that these results point out only weak 
evidence for the significance of the abnormal returns in the declined demand 
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subsample and it is hard to draw conclusions based on statistically significant 
abnormal returns on a random event day in the event window. Positive cumu-
lative average abnormal returns may indicate that declined demand as a cited 
reason is seen as a more proactive reason for investors and as a way of coping 
with the economic environment. For a firm that states declined demand as the 
reason for the permanent layoffs, the initial public disclosure of the permanent 
layoffs may serve as a relieving factor and investors observe these actions as 
positive rather than negative.  
Table 3. Abnormal performance for the improved efficiency subsample. 
Daily average abnormal returns (AR), cumulative abnormal returns (CAAR) and t-statistics for 
the improved efficiency subsample of 57 permanent layoffs followed by the CAARs and t-
statistics measured for different event intervals. Day 0 is the event day for the initial announce-
ment for the disclosure of the permanent layoffs in the stock exchange and business news me-
dia. Standard two-sided t-test was used for testing the statistical significance of the abnormal 
returns. Symbols * (**, ***) indicate significance at the .10 (.05, .01) level using two-tailed test.  
t(day) AR 
  
CAAR 
  
t-statistic of AR 
  
      
-5 0,18 %   0,18 %   0,72   
-4 -0,33 %   -0,15 %   -0,94   
-3 -0,10 %   -0,25 %   -0,42   
-2 0,25 %   -0,002 %   0,70   
-1 0,06 %   0,06 %   0,20   
0 -0,29 %   -0,23 %   -1,45   
1 0,42 %   0,19 %   1,53   
2 -0,60 % ** -0,41 %   -2,13   
3 0,75 %   0,35 %   1,14   
4 0,22 %   0,57 %   0,95   
5 -0,17 %   0,40 %   -0,73   
CAAR interval [-5,+5] [-5,-1] [-1,0] [-1,+1] [+1,+5]   
CAAR 0,40 % 0,06 % -0,23 % 0,19 % 0,63 %   
t-stat 0,35 0,08 -0,65 0,48 0,75   
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In the improved efficiency subsample, the results (Table 3.) show that the stock 
price reaction to the disclosures of permanent layoffs due to improved efficien-
cy is both positive and negative. Therefore, the abnormal performance can be 
observed to be rather mixed in the results and there is only weak evidence for 
the significance of the abnormal returns for this subsample. The day 2 abnormal 
return is negative (-0,60%) and significantly different from zero at the 0,05 level, 
but as in the case of declined demand it is rather problematic to analyze a ran-
dom single event day abnormal returns with statistical significance. The 11-day 
cumulative average abnormal return for the improved efficiency subsample is 
0,40% and it is lower than that of the declined demand subsample. This may 
indicate that improved efficiency as a cited reason has a lower information val-
ue for investors compared with the declined demand subsample.  
Both subsamples showed positive 11-day cumulative average abnormal returns 
indicating that the stock price reaction to permanent layoffs and the disclosures 
of these layoffs are seen as proactive by the investors. The significance of the 
abnormal returns according to test statistics in both subsamples indicated only 
very weak significance for the results. Based on the results, the answer to the 
research question one (Q1) is that stock prices do react to permanent layoff an-
nouncement disclosures, but provide no reliable statistical significance for the 
abnormal returns. The stock price reactions to the cited reason of permanent 
layoffs were also tested in two different business cycles, but the results did not 
produce any further empirical evidence to the results presented in this part of 
the chapter.  
 
5.2 Abnormal performance with value and growth subsamples 
The abnormal performance and the difference between value and growth was 
tested by dividing the permanent layoffs based on the firms’ layoff year’s me-
dian P/B ratios into value and growth subsamples for two different business 
cycles. The non-recessionary period consisted of the years between 2004 and 
2007 and included an overall amount of 66 permanent layoff announcements. 
The recessionary period between the years 2008 and 2010 included 94 perma-
nent layoff announcements. This distinction for the business cycles is important, 
since it is possible that the reactions to layoffs differ during recessionary and 
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non-recessionary periods (See Ursel & Armstrong-Stassen 1995). The increase of 
the layoff announcements from 66 in the non-recessionary period to 94 in the 
recessionary period is consistent with the studies by Elayan et al. (1998) and 
Farber and Hallock (2009) that the number of layoffs seems to follow the busi-
ness cycle quite closely.  
In the table 4., the cumulative average abnormal returns for the selected 7-day 
interval inside the 11-day event window indicate that value stocks’ reaction to 
the disclosures of the layoffs is more negative than that of the growth stocks in 
the non-recessionary business cycle of 2004-2007. For the value subsample, the 
daily abnormal returns are rather mixed for the event period and the abnormal 
and cumulative average abnormal returns show no signs of statistical signific-
ance.  
In the growth subsample, abnormal returns for the days -3 and 0 are statistically 
significant on the 0,10 level. This may point out that growth investors predict 
the outcome of the layoff co-operational negotiations and might have informa-
tion signals of the layoff disclosures beforehand, as early as three days before 
the initial disclosure. Similar pre-announcement market reaction was also re-
ported by Worrell et al. (1991). The event day 0 statistically significant abnormal 
returns indicate that growth investors see the disclosures of layoff announce-
ments as trustworthy positive signals for the market and, therefore, the stock 
market reacts efficiently to the information.  
The positive cumulative average abnormal return of 1,55% for the days ranging 
from three days before the event until three days after the event indicates that 
investors can earn abnormal returns from growth stocks in a non-recessionary 
business cycle. The cumulative average abnormal return for the growth sub-
sample for the 7-day interval (-3, 3) is significantly different from zero on the 
0,05 level. The two-day cumulative average abnormal return of 0,87% ranging 
from the event day 0 until the following day and the three-day cumulative av-
erage abnormal return of 1,12% are significantly different from zero on the 0,10 
level. The results from the non-recessionary period support the research ques-
tions of this study (Q2 & Q3) that the stock price reaction differs between value 
and growth and that the value stocks’ reaction to the disclosure of permanent 
layoffs is more negative than the growth stocks’ reaction.  
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Table 4. Abnormal performance for value and growth subsamples 2004-2007. 
Daily average abnormal returns (AR), cumulative abnormal returns (CAAR) and t-statistics for 
the value (low P/B) subsample of 33 permanent layoffs and the growth (high P/B) subsample of 
similar amount, followed by the CAARs and t-statistics measured for different event intervals. 
Day 0 is the event day for the initial announcement for the disclosure of the permanent layoffs 
in the stock exchange and business news media. Standard two-sided t-test was used for testing 
the statistical significance of the abnormal returns. Symbols * (**, ***) indicate significance at the 
.10 (.05, .01) level using two-tailed test.  
value subsample (n=33)           
t(day) AR 
  
CAAR 
  
t-statistic of AR 
    
-3 -0,22 %   -0,22 %   -0,97   
-2 -0,28 %   -0,49 %   -1,36   
-1 0,27 %   -0,22 %   0,89   
0 -0,23 %   -0,45 %   -1,08   
1 0,07 %   -0,38 %   0,24   
2 -0,13 %   -0,51 %   -0,56   
3 0,09 %   -0,42 %   0,32   
CAAR interval [-3,+3] [-1,0] [0,+1] [-1,+1]     
CAAR -0,42 % 0,04 % -0,16 % 0,11 %     
t-stat -0,73 0,15 -0,45 0,24     
growth subsample (n=33)         
t(day) AR 
  
CAAR 
  
t-statistic of AR 
    
-3 0,39 % * 0,39 %   1,99   
-2 0,41 %   0,80 %   1,55   
-1 0,25 %   1,05 %   0,64   
0 0,49 % * 1,54 %   1,87   
1 0,38 %   1,92 %   1,09   
2 -0,15 %   1,77 %   -0,48   
3 -0,22 %   1,55 %   -0,79   
CAAR interval [-3,+3] [-1,0] [0,+1] [-1,+1]     
CAAR 1,55 %** 0,74 % 0,87 %* 1,12 %*     
t-stat 2,13 1,40 1,97 1,86     
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In the table 5., the abnormal performance for the value and growth in the reces-
sionary period of 2008-2010 is presented. Even though, this recessionary period 
is only half the length of the non-recessionary period of 2004-2007, the amount 
of layoff announcements has grown from 66 to 94 during the period. When the 
value and growth abnormal performance are compared, it can be seen that the 
results are rather mixed and the abnormal returns received are both positive 
and negative with weak statistical significance (only on day 2 for the growth 
subsample at the 0,10 level).  
Overall, the cumulative average abnormal returns for the value subsample are 
less positive or more negative than the returns for the growth subsample. The 7-
day cumulative average abnormal return (-3,3) for the value subsample 0,11% is 
less positive than that of the growth subsample 0,44% and the other three cu-
mulative average abnormal returns observed are more negative for the value 
than for the growth subsample. This is also consistent with the research ques-
tions of this study (Q2 & Q3) that there are differences between value and 
growth in the stock price reaction to the disclosures of permanent layoffs and 
this reaction is less positive or more negative for value stocks than for growth 
stocks.  
Ahern (2009) suggests that using valuation samples, such as samples based on 
P/B or P/E ratios, in event studies may cause biased results and problems in the 
statistical significance tests. The study concludes that the significance of the ab-
normal performance is rejected more often for the value (low P/B) firms accord-
ing to the t-statistics than for the growth (high P/B) firms. This finding may help 
to clarify the results for the value and growth subsamples used in this study 
and, especially, the lack of statistical significance in the value subsample ab-
normal performance.  
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Table 5. Abnormal performance for value and growth subsamples 2008-2010. 
Daily average abnormal returns (AR), cumulative abnormal returns (CAAR) and t-statistics for 
the value (low P/B) subsample of 47 permanent layoffs and the growth (high P/B) subsample of 
similar amount, followed by the CAARs and t-statistics measured for different event intervals. 
Day 0 is the event day for the initial announcement for the disclosure of the permanent layoffs 
in the stock exchange and business news media. Standard two-sided t-test was used for testing 
the statistical significance of the abnormal returns. Symbols * (**, ***) indicate significance at the 
.10 (.05, .01) level using two-tailed test. 
value subsample (n=47)           
t(day) AR 
  
CAAR 
  
t-statistic of AR 
    
-3 -0,04 %   -0,04 %   -0,10 
 -2 0,34 %   0,30 %   0,53   
-1 0,29 %   0,60 %   0,75   
0 -0,52 %   0,07 %   -1,25   
1 0,11 %   0,18 %   0,27   
2 -0,53 %   -0,35 %   -1,27   
3 0,46 %   0,11 %   0,52   
CAAR interval [-3,+3] [-1,0] [0,+1] [-1,+1]     
CAAR 0,11 % -0,23 % -0,42 % -0,12 %     
t-stat 0,08 -0,38 -0,94 -0,21     
growth subsample (n=47)         
t(day) AR 
  
CAAR 
  
t-statistic of AR 
    
-3 -0,04 %   -0,04 %   -0,17   
-2 -0,04 %   -0,08 %   -0,14   
-1 -0,28 %   -0,36 %   -0,65   
0 0,27 %   -0,09 %   0,79   
1 0,00 %   -0,09 %   0,01   
2 0,83 % * 0,75 %   1,83   
3 -0,30 %   0,44 %   -1,00   
CAAR interval [-3,+3] [-1,0] [0,+1] [-1,+1]     
CAAR 0,44 % -0,01 % 0,28 % -0,01 %     
t-stat 0,53 -0,02 0,57 -0,01     
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5.3 Ordinary least squares regression 
This part of the chapter is based on the observation of the amount of workers 
laid off, firm size and their possible effects on the abnormal returns during two 
different business cycles. The relationship between stock price reaction to 
layoff-to-employee ratio and firm size is observed in the non-recessionary pe-
riod of 2004-2007 and the recessionary period of 2008-2010. The impact of the 
disclosures of permanent layoffs to stock prices is examined by using an OLS 
estimation procedure similar to Palmon et al. (1997). In the procedure the rela-
tion between the layoff ratio, firm size and the two-day cumulative average ab-
normal return is observed.  
Table 6. Descriptive statistics for different business cycles. 
Panel A. Permanent layoffs 2004-2007 (n=66) 
Descriptive measure Mean Median Std 
CAR (-1,0) 0,0039 -0,0013 0,0241 
Total employees per firm 14779 8386 17722 
Layoff ratio 0,0154 0,0098 0,0186 
Panel B. Permanent layoffs 2008-2010 (n=94) 
Descriptive measure Mean Median Std 
CAR (-1,0) -0,0012 -0,0021 0,0398 
Total employees per firm 18565 9883 26640 
Layoff ratio 0,0165 0,0071 0,0303 
In the table (Table 6.) the descriptive statistics for the total employees per firm 
and layoff ratio in the two business cycles are presented. Panel A in the table 
shows that during the years between 2004 and 2007 the average size of the firms 
announcing permanent layoffs indicated by the mean of the total employees per 
firm was 14779 and the average layoff ratio was 0,0154. The layoff ratio shows 
that at the average 1,54% of the firms’ workforce was made redundant in the 66 
layoffs from the years 2004-2007.  
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Panel B indicates that in the recessionary period of 2008-2010 not only were 
there more layoffs, but also the amount of total employees and the layoff ratio 
were larger than during the period of 2004-2007.  
In addition to the layoff ratio (denoted as LATER, layoff-to-employee ratio), the 
logarithm of firm size (denoted as FSIZE) is added as an explanatory variable 
because firm size can affect abnormal returns, and the average firm size in the 
recessionary period subsample is larger than in the non-recessionary period. 
The cumulative average abnormal return (denoted as CAR(-1,0)) used in the re-
gression is measured from days -1 and zero, as in one day preceding the an-
nouncement and the initial announcement day. The regression model for the 
OLS estimation procedure is specified as follows (Equation 15.).  
 
(15.)  FSIZELATERCAR 21)0,1(  
 
Table 7. The results for the OLS - regression. 
Panel A. Permanent layoffs 2004-2007 (n=66)       
Independent variables       
Constant LATER FSIZE R2  F-stat p-Value  
-0,002 -0,072 0,001 0,007 0,207 0,814 
(-0,07) (-0,39) (-0,27)       
            
Panel B. Permanent layoffs in the years 2008-2010 (n=94)   
Independent variables       
Constant LATER FSIZE R2 F-stat p-Value  
0,014 0,072 -0,002 0,010 0,445 0,642 
(-0,38) (-0,44) (-0,47)       
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In the table above (Table 7.) the results for the OLS regression are presented. 
The beta coefficient for LATER in the non-recessionary period of 2004-2007 
(Panel A.) indicates that the layoff ratio is negatively correlated with the two-
day cumulative average abnormal return by -0,072. In the Panel B. the beta coef-
ficient shows a correlation of a similar size, but positive for the recessionary 
period of 2008-2010.  
The R2 is the fraction of the variation in the two-day cumulative average ab-
normal return that can be explained by layoff ratio and firm size. A value of R2 
that is nearly zero indicates a poor fit of the OLS line (Wooldridge 2009: 43). For 
the subsample of the years 2004-2007, the R2 of 0,007 shows that 0,7% of the 
two-day cumulative average abnormal return variation is explained by layoff 
ratio and firm size. In the subsample of 2008-2010 the R2 of 0,010 similarly indi-
cates that 1% of the variation is explained by the independent variables. These 
R2 values mean that for the both subsamples respectively 99,3% and 99% of the 
variation in the stock price reactions is left unexplained. F-statistics and p-
values state that the layoff-to-employee ratio and firm size as explanatory va-
riables are unable to impact the stock price reaction. 
The results of the OLS regression indicate that layoff ratio and firm size are un-
able to explain the stock price reaction in both subsamples and the regression 
results lack any statistical significance. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this study was to examine the stock price reactions to perma-
nent layoff announcements and to compare the differences in the reaction of 
value and growth stocks in Finland. The focus of this study was in the stock 
market reaction for the final disclosure of permanent layoffs, indicating the an-
nouncement for the final decision of the company co-determination negotia-
tions.  
Three research questions were formed for the basis of the study. First research 
question (Q1) covered the stock price reaction to the disclosures of permanent 
layoff announcements. The second research question (Q2) was whether the 
stock price reaction to permanent layoff announcements’ disclosure differs be-
tween growth and value stocks. The last research question (Q3) stated that val-
ue stocks would signal a less positive or more negative to permanent layoff dis-
closures during different business cycles than growth stocks.  
The empirical results were obtained from three different perspectives. First of 
all, the first research question was observed and it was tested if the cited rea-
sons mentioned by the layoff firms for the permanent layoff affect the stock 
price reaction by dividing the sample to declined demand and improved effi-
ciency subsamples. Secondly, the possible differences in the stock price reaction 
to permanent layoffs between value and growth were tested in different busi-
ness cycles. This value and growth perspective was observed on the assump-
tions based on the research questions two and three. Thirdly, an additional em-
pirical analysis was examined to find out whether the layoff size and firm size 
have impact on the abnormal returns. The impact of the layoff size and firm size 
to the stock price reaction was tested with OLS regression.  
The empirical results show that both declined demand and improved efficiency 
as a cited reason for permanent layoff have positive, but not statistically signifi-
cant, 11-day cumulative average abnormal returns. This may indicate that the 
disclosures of permanent layoffs are seen as proactive by the investors. The de-
clined demand subsample cumulative average abnormal returns were more 
positive than those of the improved efficiency subsample. For a firm that states 
declined demand as the reason for the permanent layoffs, the final public dis-
closure of the permanent layoffs may serve more as a relief and as a positive 
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signal for the investors. Based on the results for the abnormal performance and 
cited reason for the layoff, the answer to the first research question (Q1) is that 
stock prices do react to the disclosures of permanent layoffs, but provide no 
reliable statistical significance for the abnormal returns. 
During the non-recessionary period of the years 2004 until 2007, value stocks 
indicated a negative 7-day cumulative average abnormal return with no statis-
tical significance. Growth stocks, on the other hand, showed positive cumula-
tive average abnormal returns with statistical significance in three different in-
tervals. This shows that the stock price reactions to permanent layoffs differ 
between value and growth stocks and that value stocks signal a more negative 
reaction during a non-recessionary period of 2004–2007 than growth stocks.  For 
the growth subsample, also the event days -3 and 0 showed statistically signifi-
cant positive abnormal returns, which may point out that investors get the in-
formation of the disclosures of the permanent layoffs beforehand and the mar-
ket reacts efficiently to this information, as well as to the initial announcement.  
In the recessionary period of 2008–2010, the value subsample showed less posi-
tive or more negative cumulative average abnormal returns than the growth 
subsample. Even though, the cumulative average abnormal returns were lack-
ing any statistical significance, the 7-day cumulative average abnormal return 
for the value subsample was less positive than that for the growth subsample. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the results are consistent with the research 
questions two and three.  
As value stocks are sometimes regarded as economic distress stocks, the empir-
ical results may indicate that investors see the disclosures of permanent layoffs 
for value stocks more positively during economic downturns than during up-
turns, when the results are compared between the non-recessionary and reces-
sionary period. In the case of growth stocks, the stock price reaction is more 
positive during the non-recessionary period than during recessionary period. 
The stock price reaction to the disclosures of permanent layoffs is larger for 
growth stocks than for value stocks and in many cases more statistically signifi-
cant as well. Therefore, it may be hypothesized that the information value of the 
disclosures of permanent layoffs is larger for growth stocks than for value 
stocks.  
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All in all, it can be concluded that even though a large body of research studies 
find that value stocks outperform growth stocks on the long run, the results of 
this study point out that the stock price reaction to the disclosures of permanent 
layoffs is less positive or more negative for value stocks than for growth stocks.  
It is important to keep in mind that this study tested the market reaction to an-
nouncements of the disclosure of permanent layoffs, as in actual permanent 
layoffs rather than the announcements for the beginning of co-determination 
negotiations. The observation of permanent layoffs in this study has similarities 
with that of the research paper by Palmon et al. (1997). This point of view is in-
teresting since business media have always speculated with the issue and this 
subject seems to appear frequently in the every-day conversations of people 
especially during recessions. 
The new perspective of this study was the analysis of possible differing reac-
tions between growth and value stocks’ reactions to the disclosures of perma-
nent layoffs. Value and growth analysis is always a current topic in finance and 
much discussed in the public with wide range of research studies stating the 
pros and cons for either side. An important contribution for this study was to 
examine whether the value and growth differences can be tested in the event of 
layoff announcement disclosure and if the empirical results received from the 
analysis can be implications for further research.  
One of the implications for future research from this study could be to examine 
the stock price reaction to permanent layoffs from a longer time period and to 
test whether the value and growth differences exist in a larger data sample from 
the Finnish or Nordic stock markets. The testing of firm performance reactions 
to layoffs in Finland or the Nordic countries could be another particular subject 
of future research. The value and growth firms could be taken into the research 
as well with observation of post-announcement firm performance differences. 
An interesting point of view could be to research the abnormal performance of 
value and growth stocks to layoffs and the possible biases in the value-growth 
observations with different statistical models and, especially, different statistical 
significance tools. This implication for future research could try to further ex-
amine the biasness for statistical significance in the value and growth stocks’ 
returns stated by Ahern (2009). The differences in the magnitude of value and 
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growth stocks’ reaction could also be compared by dividing the value and 
growth stocks into different groups by firm size or industry for a more specified 
sample selection.  
In this study, the differences between single and multiple announcements were 
not taken into account, but for future research this layoff characteristic would 
be very interesting to observe more closely. This implication could be examined 
with a longer time period and separately with permanent and temporary layoff 
announcements. Also, the value and growth dimension could be taken into ob-
servation in this implication.  
The subject of layoffs provides many intriguing aspects for research and regard-
less of the state of the economy this subject continues to raise questions in both 
the academic research and the public media. Layoffs are a subject which is un-
derstandable for the masses and this makes the topic even more interesting. 
Whether the layoffs in general are good or bad, positive or negative, proactive 
or reactive, is problematic to say, but in today’s business world these company 
actions are inevitable and here to stay.   
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Appendix 1. Examples of layoff announcements by the cited reason.  
1) Declining demand: The announcements of permanent layoff decisions 
that state declining sales, low product prices or poor business conditions 
as a reason for the layoff. 
Example: YIT has carried out codetermination negotiations to boost op-
erational efficiency and reduce personnel to match the changed market 
situation. Personnel cuts were necessary because the market situation of 
the Network Services business unit has weakened significantly and per-
manently during the present year.  
 
 
2) Improved efficiency: The announcements of permanent layoff decisions 
that indicate improved profitability or efficiency as the cited reason for 
the layoffs.  
Example: Fiskars’ codetermination negotiations as a part of a substantial 
reorganization of its production capacity have ended. The measures tak-
en were aimed at improving profitability and competitiveness through 
cost savings, streamlined production, outsourcing some of the more la-
bour intensive products and concentrating own manufacturing and new 
product development on the well-known Fiskars branded core products.  
